We develop a simple theory and conduct a laboratory experiment to explore the e↵ect of information about charities' performances and its public visibility on the intensive margins of charitable giving (i.e. existing donors). In our model existing donors with di↵erent preferences for giving treat their donations as either complements or (imperfect) substitutes to the quality of the charity. Greater e ciency induces some donors to give more, since an extra dollar donated goes "further". Other donors instead reduce their giving, because the same e↵ective donation can now be achieved with a smaller nominal contribution (i.e. crowd-out). Similarly, when information about "quality" is immediately recognizable by others, its social signaling value provides extrinsic incentives to image motivated donors to modify their giving: on the one hand higher e ciency increases the marginal return on social image of an extra dollar donated, thus giving increases; on the other, higher e ciency reduces the monetary cost of looking pro-social, and donors trade-o↵ the amount they give with the "quality" of the recipient. Our experimental results show no evidence of a substitution e↵ect when information is received privately; that is, giving is always non-decreasing in the "quality" of the recipient. Di↵erently, when information has a social signaling value, we find that 34% of donors decrease their giving when charities are better-than-expected, and (marginally) increasing giving when worse. These results support the hypothesis of a substitution e↵ect for image-motivated donors.
Introduction
In the last two decades, the amount of information available to donors about charities' activities, e ciency, and transparency has increased dramatically.
Today several non-profit organizations, such as Charity Navigator, The Urban Institute, GiveWell, Charity Watch and Give Star, to name few, review and monitor charities to help donors compare organizations and make informed giving decisions. 1 The demand for information is on the rise as well: Charity Navigator, a large charity rating website, reported in 2013 more than 4.8M single visitors and an estimated impact on charitable donations of US$ 10 Billion in 2012. Information is not just becoming more easily accessible, but also more easy to share with (and be monitored by) peers, thanks to the growing presence of charities and charity hubs on various social networks (e.g. Facebook, Google+).
Despite measures of charities' performances are widely available, there is little evidence on whether this information increases or decreases the generosity of both intrinsicallymotivated donors, and donors who care about the social-image value of their generosity.
The question has relevant implications for the charitable giving market since financial e ciency represents an important component of most charity rating systems, and improving on such margins is costly for charities. Moreover, as information becomes widely accessible, donors who give mainly to look good to others may take its social signaling value into account when making their giving decisions, since announcing one's giving may implicitly provide information about the quality of the recipient. Social-image represents in fact a powerful motivation for charitable giving (see Harbaugh 1998a Harbaugh , 1998b 1988 ; Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Rege and Telle 2004) , and previous studies have shown that donors care about the social visibility of the cost of giving (Ariely, Bracha and Meier 2009) . 2 This paper takes a step toward understanding donors' response to real information about charities' e ciency and performances, which represent a measure of the e↵ective cost of giving 3 , and donors' response to its public visibility.
We propose a simple characterization of the e↵ect of (unanticipated) information on the intensive margins of giving (i.e. donations from existing donors), and we report results from a laboratory experiment.
In our model, receiving positive information about the e ciency of a charity can either increase or decrease individual giving from both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated donors, depending on whether the "quality" of the recipient and quantity of donor's giving are complements or (imperfect) substitutes in terms of donors' utility.
On the complementarity side, higher e ciency implies that the marginal value of an 1 The type of information o↵ered by watchdog websites varies: some o↵er in-dept analyses of few selected charities, while others have developed synthetic indices used to rate all charities that make their tax returns or IRS Forms 990 available.
2 i.e. how "expensive" it is for a donor to make a charitable contribution. 1 extra dollar donated increases, increasing thus the returns on e↵ective giving (see Eckel and Grossman 1996) . Some intrinsically motivated donors thus, such as donors who derive "extra" warm-glow from e↵ective giving (see i.e. Andreoni 1989) , would at least notdecrease their giving when this information is received (And vice versa when negative information is received). Similarly, when this information has a social signaling value, some donors motivated by prestige may wish to donate more, since an extra dollar donated has a higher (perceived) marginal return on their image. On the substitution side, an increase in charities' e ciency also increases the opportunity cost of using part of one's own nominal giving for other purposes. This means that, all else constant, a donor can achieve the same e↵ective giving he was expecting before receiving information with a smaller nominal contribution. Intrinsic preferences for giving such as pure altruism (see Becker 1974) and guilt (Andreoni 1988 , Benabou and Tirole 2006) predict this behavior. Similarly, when that information has a social signaling value, some donors motivated by prestige may wish to donate less if they perceive that the quality of the recipient and the quantity of their giving are (imperfect) substitutes in terms of their social image utility. That is, a donor can be less generous but still look good to others because he is giving "smartly".
We test the e↵ect of information and its public visibility on giving using a laboratory experiment. Participants make sequential giving decisions before and after receiving (unexpected) real information about the charities they have selected. While participants cannot change the initial selection of their charities, they are allowed to change the donation amounts after information is received. Before charities' e ciency is revealed, participants are incentivized to guess its value. We assume that donors whose guess is lower than real efficiency receive good news, and donors who overestimate the real e ciency of their charities receive bad news. To assess the relative e↵ect of information on donors with intrinsic and extrinsic preferences, we implement three between-subjects treatments in which we manipulate (i) whether giving decisions are revealed to other participants; and (ii) whether information about donors charities' e ciency is revealed to other participants. Critically, subjects are informed whether giving decisions will or will not be made public before they make their initial decision; instead, whether information is visible or not is revealed after the initial decision, allowing us to isolate the e↵ect of information on image motivated donors.
We report three main results. First, our data show that when positive information about charities' e ciency is private information, giving is always non-decreasing in the "quality" of news. This suggests that "quality" and quantity of giving are net complements in terms of donors' utility whenever information has no social signaling value.
Second, we find that when both giving decisions and information are private, donors are unresponsive to negative information, meaning that donation amounts are not revised when charities turn out to be less e cient than expected. However, donors respond to negative information when their giving decisions are visible to others. This is consistent with the notion that people ignore information that a↵ects them negatively when the cost Third, we find that when the e ciency of donors' charities is public information, 34% of donors respond to this new information by reducing their giving when charities are betterthan expected, and (marginally) increasing it when are worse. We show that this result is driven by participants who are relatively more motivated by social image. Compared to the other participants, these donors give significantly more when the only social signal is their contribution (e.g. initial giving decisions), but decrease their contributions as soon as a new (costless) positive social signal can be conveyed to others, namely the e ciency of their charities. We argue that this is because the subjective cost of looking pro-social decreases when positive public information is received, making thus "quality" and quantity of giving substitutes in terms of image payo↵s.
Our paper provides the first experimental test of the e↵ect standardized e ciency measures have on giving. Overall our data show that the public visibility of charities' performances is an important factor in determining whether such information boosts or reduces charitable giving. We find no evidence of a substitution e↵ect of "quality" and quantity of giving when the former has no signaling value, while we find that existing image-motivated donors trade-o↵ "quality" and quantity of giving when the former cannot be hidden from others.
Non-profit organizations are often cautious in making new investments (such as new hires, increase fundraising, and capital investments) because of the negative impact these have on their e ciency ratings (see Andreoni and Payne 2011). Our results show that not only is this information indeed important to donors, but also that the way it is conveyed matters. When targeting existing donors, our experiment suggests that widely advertising information may be sub-optimal compared to providing the same information to donors privately.
Finally, we provide a novel framework to analyze the e↵ect of information on donors' behavior. While this paper focuses on the intensive margins of charitable giving, we believe our framework provides testable implications for the aggregate e↵ect of information on the giving market. Our results on the substitution e↵ect for image motivated donors suggest that people may use threshold rules based on what they believe a "socially acceptable" gift might be. A lower cost of looking pro-social thus provides strategic incentives to existing donors to give less, but it may on the other hand encourage non-donors to start giving, precisely because looking pro-social is now a↵ordable.
Background
The economics literature has long addressed the question of why people donate money to private charities. Pure altruism fails to explain several empirical observations about charitable giving 4 In particular, the empirical evidence of the importance of social image and prestige is vast. The possibility of direct and indirect social approvals generally increases individual contributions (Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Rege and Telle 2004) . 5 Not only donors give to actively increase their social reputation and therefore utility, but often they give in to social pressure, resulting in higher contributions but lower utility (Della Vigna, List, Malmendier 2012).
As individuals appreciate the positive image consequences of giving, their generosity depends also on the cost of giving -or nominal price of giving - ( Although much is known about how warm glow and social image a↵ect individual giving, less is known about these factors interact with the information available about charities' performances (see Karlan and Wood 2014) . 6 In this direction, Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011) use real individual recipients and costly information to show that a significant fraction of their subjects is willing to pay to gather information about the recipient and achieve a distribution of income that matches their preferences, and that they use this information to withhold resources to less preferred recipients. Overall however, with costly information not all donors are willing to invest resources to find preferred recipients.
In contrast with previous research, our work uses real charities instead of individual recipients and explores the e↵ect on generosity of a real price of giving greater than one. 4 For instance, large participation, incomplete government crowd out, average contributions non decreasing in the number of contributors. See Andreoni 1988.
5 While social visibility often increases giving, recent studies have shown that individuals who are averse to both positive and negative reputation tend to conform toward the middle of others' contributions, resulting in a reduction in giving whenever others give less (Jones and Linardi 2014). 
Model
We provide a simple model which o↵ers testable implications on how agents modify their giving decisions in response to new information about the quality of their giving (e.g. e ciency of their charities), and to the social-image value this information may have. 7 In our model individuals have total endowment of M and choose a donation
Financial e ciency is the percentage of one's donation that is e↵ectively used toward the cause the charity exists to support. We assume that when information is not available, individuals who do care about e ciency choose their level of giving based on their subjective priors about the e ciency of their charities,ê 2 [0, 1]. When new information is received, donors perfectly update their beliefs to the (newly discovered) real value of e ciency e r 2 [0, 1]. 8 We assume individuals receive good news when e = e r ê > 0, and bad news when e = e r ê < 0.
Key to our model is that information can a↵ect donations either directly (e.g. complementarity between information and donations) or indirectly (e.g. substitution between information and donations).
Direct and indirect e↵ects of information on giving a↵ect both intrinsic and extrinsic motives for giving, which we assume to be additively separable.
We first consider donors who are intrinsically motivated to give. A donor who is intrinsically motivated (e.g. not motivated by social-image) solves the problem MAX
where x represents private consumption, d is the amount donated to a specific charity,
e is e ciency, and M is the total wealth. Here f (d) represents the standard warm-glow people derive from donating d dollars (warm glow from nominal giving), g(e · d) is the additional "warm-glow" or gratification deriving from e↵ective giving, h(e · x) is a function that captures the e↵ect of news on the opportunity cost of alternative uses of money (e.g. private consumption, donation to other charities etc.), and c(d) is a cost function. Finally, ↵ 2 [0; 1] can be thought as either an individual preferences' parameter or a population parameter. We assume that f , g, h, c are well-behaved continuous and di↵erentiable functions, and
U (x, d) thus describes preferences of an individual who receives warm-glow from nominal giving f (d), and for whom the e↵ect of a change in the value of e ciency on his giving decisions depends on a linear combination of two factors: on one hand, the warm-glow benefit deriving from e cient giving, (1 ↵) · g(e · d), and on the other the opportunity cost of using money for other purposes, ↵ · h(e · x).
Proof. If ↵ = 0 and news is good, the first order condition of (1) becomes
From the concavity of g and f , if e increases then nominal giving d increases. Results when news is bad follow the same logic.
Proposition 1 states that when information about e ciency a↵ects giving only directly through g(e·d) (e.g. warm-glow from e↵ective giving), an increase in e ciency always leads to a non-decrease in the contribution level (and viceversa). Higher e ciency, in fact, implies that a larger fraction of one's own nominal giving would contribute to the e↵ective programs the charity provides, thus the marginal return of an extra dollar donated increases. The assumption that individual derive extra warm-glow from e↵ective giving is necessary to justify an increase in giving as a response to increased e ciency. A non-decrease in giving instead can be explained by traditional incomplete crowding-out models (Andreoni 1989 (Andreoni , 1990 . 9 In our model thus, when ↵ = 0, "quality" and quantity of giving are complements for intrinsic motivated donors.
Proof. If ↵ = 1 and news is good, the first order condition of (1) becomes
From the concavity of g and convexity of h with respect to d, if e increases then nominal giving d decreases. Results when news is bad follow the same logic.
Proposition 2 states that when information about e ciency indirectly a↵ects donors' utility, good news decrease nominal giving (and vice versa). As e ciency increases, so does the opportunity cost of using part of the money devoted to a charity for private consumption or to make donations to other charities. The e ciency of the charity can in fact be viewed as a price of giving above $1.00. So for instance, to make an e↵ective gift of $9 to a charity believed to be 50% e cient (ê = 0.5), a donor should donate $18. However, if the donor receives good news about the e ciency of his charity (e.g. e r = 0.9), he now has to donate only $10 to secure the same e↵ective donation of $9. While the e↵ective donation remains constant from the donor's perspective, his nominal contribution 9 Models of warm-glow assume that individual utility depends on both total contributions G and individual giving gi. If utility depends on G ⇤ = e · G, the total amount of e↵ective contributions, then impure altruists are unwilling to perfectly substitute g to o↵set an increase in G ⇤ .
decreases. In this case the "quality" and quantity of giving are (imperfect) substitutes for intrinsic motivated donors. This indirect (and negative) relationship between e ciency and giving can accommodate di↵erent interpretations. First, donors displaying this type of behavior may be pure altruists (Andreoni 1989 ). As a pure altruist donor receives private positive information about e ciency, he may realize that now less money is needed for the charity to meet its goals. This could induce him to either increase private consumption (crowd-out) or move his giving where is most needed (a sort of "Mary Poppins" e↵ect 10 ).
A second interpretation relies on the notion of guilt (Andreoni 1988, Benabou and Tirole 2006). If individuals give to avoid guilt of not giving, higher e ciency may reduce the disutility people experience from not giving and thus provide an excuse to give less.
Finally, higher e ciency may increase individuals' expectations of how good they could be. Higher expectations would make current donations insu cient; however, higher (more e↵ective) donations represent an "intolerable aspiration", pushing donors to actually reduce their giving (see Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni 2013) .
We now consider donors who are extrinsically motivated (e.g. social-image).
As information about charities' e ciency becomes common knowledge, donors who give to look good to others may well take into account information's social signaling value when choosing how much to give. In what follows we assume that when information about charities' e ciency is public, donors who advertise their generosity always implicitly provide information about the characteristics of the recipient (i.e. information cannot be hidden). 11 Further, we assume that donors' priorsê coincide with previously available public information.
Call s e = {0; 1} a binary variable that equals zero when information is private, and one when information is public. Further, define q(e · d) a (continuous and concave in d) function that represents the image-returns from e↵ective giving, and z(e · x) a (continuous and convex in d) function that represents the opportunity cost of "looking pro-social" 12 . Finally, define 2 [0, 1] as either an individual preference parameter or a population parameter.
A donor whose utility depends on extrinsic motives (e.g. social image) thus solves:
, s e = 1). All else equal, if = 0 and e = e r ê 0,
Proof. The proof follows the same logic of Proposition 1. Proposition 3 states that when the signaling value of information only a↵ects donors' image payo↵s directly, all else equal, an increase in e ciency always leads to a non-decrease in the contribution level (and vice versa). When positive public information is received, an image-motivated donor increases the amount of giving to the charity since the "social-image returns" he gets from an extra dollar donated increase. Otherwise said, the "quality" and "quantity" of giving are complements in terms of social-image payo↵s.
, s e = 1). All else equal, if = 1 and e = e r ê 0,
Proof. The proof follows the same logic of Proposition 2. Proposition 4 shows that when the signaling value of information a↵ects donors' image payo↵s indirectly, an increase in e ciency decreases the level of nominal giving (and vice versa). The argument is simple: as e ciency increases, all else equal, looking pro-social becomes cheaper, since new (positive) information is conveyed to others when one donates. As a consequence, a donor who receives good news can maintain his "image payo↵" constant by reducing his nominal contribution. Otherwise said, the "quality" and "quantity" of giving are (imperfect) substitutes in terms of social-image payo↵s.
As detailed in the next section, our experiment manipulates the extent to which information and nominal giving have a social signaling value.
This allows us to cast the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: If "quality" and quantity of giving are complements in terms of intrinsic preferences (e.g. private information), then good news would always non-decrease average giving (and vice versa).
Hypothesis 2: If "quality" and quantity of giving are imperfect substitutes in terms of intrinsic preferences (e.g. private information), then good news would always non-increase average giving (and vice versa).
Hypothesis 3:
Controlling for intrinsic preferences, if "quality" and quantity of giving are complements in terms of extrinsic preferences (e.g. public information), then good news would always non-increase average giving (and vice versa).
Hypothesis 4:
Controlling for intrinsic preferences, if "quality" and quantity of giving are (imperfect) substitutes in terms of extrinsic preferences (e.g. public information), then good news would always non-increase average giving (and vice versa).
Experiment design 4.1 Overview and Treatments
Subjects participate in a simple individual decision making experiment. The experiment consists of two phases, with the second phase disclosed to subjects only at the end of the first phase. In the first phase of all treatments, subjects choose three charities from a list of more than 5000 charities. 13 With each of the charities, subjects choose how to split their endowment between themselves and the charity, knowing that only one split (and thus one charity) will be randomly selected for final implementation. In the second phase subjects receive new information about their charities' e ciency and are allowed, should they wanted to, to adjust their initial decisions in response to this new information. One of three decisions from the second and last phase is implemented according to a compound lottery. Subjects and the selected charity are paid accordingly. We design three treatments for this experiment, each with two aforementioned phases. Our three treatments di↵ered in whether the implemented decision is publicly revealed at the end of the experiment, and whether the information each subject receive is publicly revealed at the end of the experiment. In all treatments the name of the randomly chosen charity is never revealed to other participants nor to the experimenter. The name and personal information of all subjects is also never revealed.
In our control treatment T0 all decisions and information are private. In treatment 1 (T1), subjects are required to stand up at the end of the experiment and announce only how much they donated to the randomly chosen charity. In treatment 2 (T2), subjects are required to stand at the end of the experiment and announce both the amount donated to the randomly chosen charity and the information received about that charity in the second phase. Subjects in T1 and T2 are explicitly told that the name of the charity may not be revealed.
At the beginning of phase 1, participants learn whether their donation decision will be private or publicly revealed. At the beginning of phase 2, participants learn whether the e ciency of the randomly chosen charity will be private or publicly revealed.
Note that phase 1 decisions are fully comparable across treatments T1 and T2, since in both treatments the information set is the same: they only know that the donation to the randomly selected charity will be publicly revealed, but are unaware of the second phase, and therefore that information will be received. Table 1 summarizes our experimental procedure. E ciency explained; comprehension quiz; subjects guess their charities' eciency; real e ciency revealed; final donation decisions, and choice of favorite (if ever). Explained that e ciency of the final charity will be private.
One of three final decisions (Phase 2) implemented by compound lottery. Subjects paid in private.
T1 As in T0, but subjects aware that final donation will be made public.
As in T0. Subjects reminded that donations will be made public. Explained that e ciency of the final charity will be private.
As in T0, but subjects must stand and announce the implemented donation amount.
T2 As in T1, subjects aware that final donation will be made public.
As in T1, but subjects are explained that both donation and real e ciency of final charity will be made public.
As in T1, but subjects must stand and announce both donation amount and e ciency.
Detailed procedure
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects are endowed with 25 experimental dollars (E$; equivalent to US$ 17). Participants are presented with a web-based search interface 14 for a database of approximately 5,400 charitable organizations rated by the charity watchdog Charity Navigator (CN). Subjects are asked to select three charities from the database and answer questions about their familiarity with, and attitude toward each charity.
After completing a comprehension quiz, subjects decide how to split their initial endowment of E$ 25 between themselves and each charity. Any integer amount from zero up to and including E$ 25 can be donated to each charity.
Subjects are assigned a random ID number, and are explained that donations will be made on their behalf by the experimenter, using the ID number as the donor name. Later, subjects collect the receipt of the donation, and verify that the correct amount is sent.
We explain that the three decisions are independent, meaning that at the end of the experiment only one decision is randomly selected for implementation, and that subjects are paid according to the split chosen for the randomly-implemented charity. Before the beginning of phase 1, subjects in treatments T1 and T2 are informed that the donation amount they allocate to the randomly-implemented charity will be publicly revealed at the end of the experiment.
In addition, subjects are given the possibility to increase the probability that one of the three charities is implemented by marking one charity as favorite. Since the beginning, subjects know that a compound lottery consisting of a coin toss and a die roll will determine which decision is implemented. If no favorite is indicated, each decision stands a one in three chance of being implemented (Pr. = 33.3%). However, conditional on a favorite being chosen, that favorite charity stands an increased chance of being implemented of two in three (Pr. = 66.6%) 15 .
At the end of Phase 1, subjects are informed that a second and last phase begins, and that they will receive additional information about the charities they chose. After information is received, they will be able modify, if they want, their decisions from phase 1. We explain that this second set of decisions is the only one considered for final payments. 16 Subjects are then provided with explanations and examples about a single, homogenized measure used by Charity Navigator to rate charities called "program expenses". 17 Program expenses is the ratio of dollars spent providing services in pursuit of the charity's stated mission. The residual below unity can be thought of as the percentage of a charity's budget spent on fundraising and administrative expenses. 18 15 At the end of the experiment we flip a coin and then roll a die in front of everyone. The coin flip is relevant for participants that select a charity as favorite: an outcome of "heads" indicates that the decision associated with the favorite charity is implemented; if the outcome is "tails", participants who choose a favorite charity wait for the die roll. The die roll determines which decision is implemented for subjects who do not choose a favorite charity (and for subjects who have a favorite charity when the outcome of the coin flip is "tails"). For the die roll, an outcome of one or two indicates that the decision associated with the first charity on each subject's list is implemented; three or four, the second charity; and five or six, the third. 16 Note that there is no deception involved in the experiment, since all decisions made in phase 1 are still part of the action set of participants in phase 2. Moreover, decisions made in phase 1 are never revealed to anyone, meaning that others never learn whether a subject's final decision is di↵erent from the decision made in phase 1.
17 Charity Navigator, section "How Do We Rate Charities' Financial Health?" 18 Measures of financial health and e ciency are not immune from critiques. Practitioners have pointed that one-fits-all metrics pose several problems: (i) di↵erent non-profit sectors have di↵erent production After a quick comprehension quiz about Charity Navigator's mission and the interpretation of the e ciency measure, subjects are asked to hide their decision sheets from phase 1 and return their initial list of charities' names to the lab assistant.
While the lab assistant adds information to the lists about the e ciency of the chosen charities, we ask subjects to guess each charity's actual program expenses ratio, as well as how confident they are in their guess by asking to provide the likelihood that the true ratio falls within each of five quintiles. Subjects are informed that their sheet with the charities' list will be returned to them, completed with the real value for each charity: if their guess is within +/-5% from the true value, they receive additional E$ 6 at the end of the experiment.
We remind subjects in T1 and T2 that the donation amount they allocated to the final (phase 2) randomly-implemented charity will be publicly revealed at the end of the experiment. If subjects are in treatment T2, they are also informed that the program expenses rating of the randomly-implemented charity will also be revealed. Subjects in T0 are instead reminded that all their decisions and information will be kept private.
Afterwards, the lab assistant returns the worksheets with the lists of charities and charities' information to the subjects, at which point subjects can modify, if they want to, their initial split and their favorite charity. Finally, once final decisions are made, one of the three decisions is implemented according to the compound lottery.
At the end of the experiment, in T0 subjects are called one by one and paid by a third person not related to the experiment. In T1, subjects are asked to stand up and announce in front of other participants how much they donated to the randomly selected charity, and then paid in private. In T2, subjects are asked to stand up and announce in front of other participants how much they donated to the randomly selected charity, and how e cient the randomly selected charity is. They are then paid in private. Once again, in all treatments the names of the charities are not revealed either to the experimenter or to other participants. 19 functions (e.g. spending 40% on program expenses may be unreasonable for a soup kitchen, but not for a cancer research institute); (ii) large charities benefit from economies of scale while small ones do not, thus a direct comparison based on standardized metrics may be misleading; and (iii) standardized measures distort non-profits' incentives to make investments (e.g. hiring new personnel worsens these measures). While we do not take sides on this debate, we designed our experiment to maximize the meaningfulness of giving and minimize the confounding e↵ects of providing richer information. We thus chose to sacrifice control over some unobservables (e.g. charities' choice) and to provide information about one single aspect of nonprofits' activities. The upside of our design is that we increase its external validity by allowing subjects to freely choose charities they truly care about, and reduce identification problems that would arise by providing multidimensional charities' evaluations. Further, while charities are also evaluated according to other criteria, financial e ciency still weighs for about a third in Charity Navigator's aggregate synthetic indices. 19 In T1 and T2, once the final charity is randomly selected, subjects are orally reminded to cover the other 2 decisions (and the name of the randomly selected charity) as the experimenter will stand by them when they announce their donation (both treatments) and the charity's e ciency (only T2). Because this procedure is explained in phase 1, subjects cannot misreport to others their decisions or expect to do
Experiment Implementation
We recruited 99 subjects from George Mason University. The mean age was 22.25, with about 54% of men and 46% of women; 70% of subjects took at least one course in Economics (with 57% having taken more than 2 courses). 20 Data were collected from May 2012 to July 2012 using pencil-and-paper, but subjects used a computerized search interface for part of the experiment.
Results
We organize our results as follows: in section 5.1 we present general results on (i) overall donations; (ii) real e ciency levels and individual guesses about e ciency; and (iii) decisions about favorite charities. In section 5.2 we combine individual guesses and real e ciencies to examine how the quality of information (bad/good news) about charities' e ciency a↵ects donation levels and choices of the favorite charity across treatments. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of average giving in each phase, percentage of subjects indicating a favorite charity, and guesses and real values of charities' e ciency. so. This also means that in all treatments the experimenter is unaware of the overall decisions made by participants and the characteristics or name of their recipients. 20 67.4% of subjects declared to have donated money at least once in the last year (any sum to anyone), 69.8% to have volunteered, and 12% to have tithed.
General results

Donations
Overall, participants donate a significant part of their endowment of E$ 25 to the charities they choose. With only 16.8% of subjects donating nothing in phase 1, and 17% donating nothing in phase 2, participants give on average E$ 9.25 in phase 1, and E$ 9.48 in phase 2. This leaves to subjects average final earnings of US $ 17 (including show up fee).
A two-sided Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows that donations in phase 1 are not significantly di↵erent across treatments (p=0.724); similarly, donations in phase 2 are overall similar across treatments (p=0.392).
Finally, the average di↵erence of donations between phases is not di↵erent across treatments (p=0.282). 21 It is surprising to notice that in our public treatments (T1 and T2) average donations in phase 1 are not significantly from T0 (p=0.565).
Indeed numerous papers have shown that public visibility of giving generally increases donors' contributions. However, in most of those papers individuals face only one decision while in our experiment each participant takes three simultaneous decisions. By consequence, a direct comparison of our results with previous literature may be misleading. 22 
E ciency and guesses about e ciency
We now turn to how participants form guesses about e ciency in our experiment. Real e ciency values encountered both within and between treatments are fully comparable. As the total average of real e ciency was 80.5% (s.d. 12.85) (all three treatments), averages of real e ciency values are not significantly di↵erent across the three treatments (p= 0.792). This means that across treatments, subjects selected charities very similar in terms of e ciency. Further, we do not find evidence that some subjects systematically received much skewed draws in terms of charities' e ciency, both within and across each treatment.
We draw the same conclusion for participants' guesses across and within treatments. To compare guesses across treatments one additional check is needed: in treatment T2, unlike the other two treatments, participants guess the e ciency knowing that its true value will be revealed to others. The way in which people form beliefs thus may be biased by this information. By comparing average guesses in our T2 treatment versus the other two, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects in T2 form their guesses in the same way participants in T0 and T1 do (p =0.432). Finally, average guessing errors are not significantly di↵erent across treatments (p=0.839). 21 Unless mentioned otherwise, all p-values from pairwise comparisons come from two-sided WilcoxonMann-Whitney tests or Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests. For trend comparisons of three treatments, all reported p-values come from two-sided Jonckheere-Terpstra tests. 22 When comparing within subjects donations to the three charities (i.e. how much to the first charity, to the second, etc.), we do not find significant di↵erences in either phase 1 or phase 2 (respectively p=0.431 and p=0.512).
Taken together, these results show that across treatments, participants received the same proportion of good and bad news (di↵erence between guesses and real values). Therefore results are not a consequence of systematic di↵erences of the quality of information and/or individual guesses across treatments. Table 3 shows the proportion of good and bad news received in each treatment. Note: proportion of good news ( e > 0) and bad news ( e < 0) by treatment
Guesses and information are not di↵erent across treatments, but systematic di↵erences across treatments may still exist with respect to the type of charities selected. If this is the case, unobserved characteristics of specific charitable causes may confound our analysis. Table 4 reports, for each treatment, the distribution of subjects' chosen charities by sector of activity. Using a Jonckheere-Terpstra test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of sectors is the same across treatments (p=0.476). The same conclusion can be drawn if we break down sectors into sub-sectors of activity (p=0.577). 23 23 These categories are the ones used by Charity Navigator. These categories are never presented to participants at any point during the experiment. See table 7 of Appendix A for a list of categories and the number of charities chosen in each category by treatment. For the full list of charities selected by participants see Table 8 Appendix A 
Indicating a favorite
We finally turn to decisions about the favorite charity. We find that overall most participants choose to indicate a favorite in both phase 1 (71% of subjects) and phase 2 (75.7%). The percentage of subjects choosing a favorite in phase 1 is not di↵erent across all three treatments (p=0.921), as well as when we compare treatment T0 with T1 and T1 pooled together (p=0.672). The latter result is important because it rules out that the visibility of donation amounts (known from phase 1) alters individual preferences for indicating or not a favorite charity. For choices in phase 2, we find that more participants choose to indicate a favorite charity in phase 2 when we move from T0 to T1 to T2 (Jonckheere Terpstra test, p=0.073).
Moving from T0 to T1 to T2, subjects switch favorite from one phase to the other more often. When participants choose to select a favorite in phase 2 and/or switch favorite, it is always a switch in favor of a more e cient charity (for treatments T0, T1, T2, p=0.012, p=0.0001, p=0.002 respectively). 24 The fact that the latter results hold also for treatment T0 suggests that people took seriously the e ciency of their charities. 25 
The good/bad news e↵ect on donations
The previous sections show that participants donate a significant portion of their endowment, that they face comparable e ciency levels across treatments, and that their guesses are comparable across treatments.
These general results allow us to analyze in depth how the subjective quality of news, the objective value of e ciency, and its social visibility a↵ect giving. As a reminder, we define "news" as the di↵erence between an individual guess about the e ciency of a charity and its real value. We assume that donors whose guess is lower than the real value receive good news, and donors whose guess is higher than the real value receive bad news. Figure 1 provides a scatter plot of the relationship between changes in donation amounts between phases (donation in phase 2 minus donation in phase 1) and the type (and intensity) of news received in phase 2 (di↵erence between real values of e ciency and subjects' guesses). One can immediately notice that the public visibility of e ciency has a dramatic e↵ect on donors' behavior. Treatments T0 and T1, in which e ciency is private information, share the same pattern of response to good news: in both, good news always increase individuals' contributions. Di↵erently, in T2 some subjects reduce their donations when good news is received.
The only di↵erence between T2 and the other two treatments is the visibility of the final charity's e ciency, therefore the emergence of this new behavioral pattern can only be attributed to the social image value information has in T2.
As a preliminary test for the e↵ect of social image on giving, we estimate the following linear model with panel-level random e↵ects:
where our dependent variable G2 ij represents the transfer made by subject i to charity j in phase 2 of the experiment as a function of (i) a vector of charities' characteristics, individual giving decisions, and individual giving decisions interacted with their social visibility, x ij , and (ii) a vector of demographic controls z ij . We assume random e↵ects ⌫
Our main variables of interest, x ij , include: (i) the donation made in phase 1, and its interaction with our public treatments; (ii) the e↵ect of news, real e ciency, and e ciency's public visibility; (iii) the choice of a favorite charity in phase 2, and its interaction with public treatments, and (iv) the general e↵ect of our public treatments on final decisions (T0 vs T1 [ T2). To assess the e↵ect of these variables on subjects' final donations, we control for a set of individual characteristics and survey questions, z ij , such as age, GPA, number of Economics classes attended, personal and family opinions on charity j, general pro-social habits, and general attitudes towards risk. Table 5 reports estimates from a random-e↵ects Tobit regression. 26 Results point to three important observations: first, donations made in phase 2 are significantly higher in treatments where some, or all relevant information is revealed to others (Public Treatments, p=0.077). Second, all else constant, donors increase their giving in response to increases in the relative e ciency of their charities (News, p=0.000; E ciency, p=0.387). Third, controlling for news e↵ect, donors reduce their giving when information about e ciency is revealed to others (p=0.029). Finally, the (average) news received for the two other decisions has no significant e↵ect on giving (p=0.432).
In addition, favorite charities receive significantly larger donations only in our public treatments (p=0.327 for the whole sample, and p=0.032 for T1 and T2). Finally, only few personal characteristics have a significant, positive e↵ect on giving in the last phase. These include the perceived importance of the charity (p=0.051), the reported GPA (p=0.009), having tithed in the last year (p=0.007), and (only marginally) the self-reported willingness to take risks in life (p=0.088). We now detail our main results by treatments using non-parametric analysis.
Result 1: When both donation amounts and e ciency are private information (T0), 18% of subjects increase their giving when they receive good news, while bad news has no e↵ect on giving.
In each treatment, about 25% of the information about charities' e ciency represents bad news for subjects.
In treatment T0 we see virtually no variations from phase 1 to phase 2 in terms of donation amounts when news is bad (p=0.632) (only one subject reduces his giving for one of his charities). 27 The same result holds when we consider reductions in donation between treatments: reductions after a bad news are significantly lower in T0 compared to treatments T1 and T2 pooled together (p=0.021).
On the contrary, we see that when news is good, participants do modify their donation behavior by increasing their contributions to better-than-expected charities (p=0.023), suggesting that e ciency is complementary to the quantity donated. This result is driven by 18% of subjects who modify their giving, and the average percentage change in donations is 38%. These represent the 13.6% of all subjects in T0.
While our model did not predict this asymmetry in information processing, our results suggest that the same mechanism of imperfect updating found in other areas of decision making may be in place when it comes to evaluate negative information about charities people care about. 28 The unresponsiveness to bad news thus suggests that a mechanism of self-reward may accompany the evaluation of charities' e ciency, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that people attach an identity value to the charities they donate to. This result has an important consequence for the overall market for giving: if people do not punish charities that are worse-than-expected but do increase donations to better-than-expected ones, then the di↵usion of e ciency measures will increase the total volume of anonymous donations from existing donors, no matter the distribution of expectations (and thus of good and bad news) in the population. 29 Result 2: When e ciency is private information but the final donation amount is disclosed to others (T1), 16% of subjects increase their giving when they receive good news, and 25% of subjects decrease their giving when they receive bad news.
In T1, when people respond to new information, good news is rewarded with increased average donations (p=0.006), while response to bad news is associated with average reductions in donation levels (p=0.027). 30 16% of the subjects who receive good news increase their donation, with average percentage increase of 21.5%. These represent the 12% of all subjects in T1. The negative variation after bad news is instead driven by 25% of the subjects, with an average percentage decrease of 7.6%. These represent the 6% of all subjects in T1.
Although in T1 the donation amount to the final charity is revealed to other participants, the signaling value of information about e ciency in T0 and T1 is the same. It is surprising thus to observe that making the donation amount public induces some participants to vary their donation amounts in response to bad news.
A possible explanation is that the visibility of the final donation amount raises the salience of information about e ciency, making subjects more sensitive to information that they would otherwise disregard. This is coherent with the idea that taking into account negative information has a psychological cost, which is avoided as far as the e↵ort needed to ignore information is low (see Benabou and Tirole 2002).
Result 3:
When e ciency is revealed to other participants, a significant fraction of subjects reduce their giving when they receive good news, and increase their giving when they receive bad news.
As the e ciency of the final charity becomes public information (T2), we observe two major di↵erences with respect to T0 and T1. First, the percentage of subjects that change their donations between phases in response to new information is significantly higher in T2. 31 Second, while in T0 and T1 virtually all variation comes from subjects that increase donations in response to good news (and decrease donations in response to bad news), in treatment T2 this relationship breaks down: 12 out of 33 (36%) variations after good news is received are decreased donations, and 4 out of 14 (28.5%) variations after bad news is received are increased donations.
As shown earlier, our Tobit model indicates that in T2 for each one percentage point increase in real e ciency there is a E$ 0.087 drop (p=0.029) in donations in phase 2.
To examine this behavior further, we divide subjects from T2 in two groups: in one group we place all subjects that have at least one decreased donation after good news (or increased donation after a bad news). This represents the group of subjects displaying a behavior absent from T0 and T1. For simplicity we call these decisions "deviant" observations. In the second group, we place all "non-deviant" subjects from T2. 32 Table 6 presents summary statistics of our main variables for the two groups from T2, and shows for each variable the results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. Table 6 shows that the two groups receive on average the same composition of good and bad news (p= 0.179). 33 Since most of the "deviant" observations are observed when good news is received, this suggests that "deviant" subjects are not just receiving all good news and rewarding the best, causing otherwise e cient charities to experience decreased donations. On the contrary, "deviant" subjects receive on average slightly less good news than "non deviant" subjects (respectively 2 and 2.43, p=0.019). We also reject the hypothesis that subjects hold di↵erent beliefs about their charities across the two groups (p=0.376). Figure 2 shows the distribution of good and bad news for the two groups from treatment T2. 33 The same conclusion can be drawn using a two-groups proportion test (p=0.518).
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Figure 2: Distribution of news for Group 2 (non-deviant) and Group 1 (deviant) subjects in T2
Information and beliefs are not statistically di↵erent across the two groups. We compare thus donation decisions and choices of a favorite charity.
First, we find that deviant subjects donate more in phase 1 compared to other subjects (p=0.024), but the di↵erence between the two groups disappears in phase 2 donations (p=0.341). For deviant subjects, average donations in phase 1 and 2 are not di↵erent from phase 1 (p=0.319). For non-deviant subjects instead, as it is for treatments T0 and T1, average contributions increase across phases (p=0.015).
Second, deviant subjects switch their favorite charity more than others subjects do (p=0.000), and they always switch toward of a more e cient charity.
We find no evidence that deviant subjects are hedging between non-favorites and the favorite charity. We find that charities not indicated as favorites in phase 2 face a significant reduction in giving across phases (p=0.002). However, final donations from deviant subjects to their favorite charities are not statistically di↵erent from donations made in phase 1 (p=0.119).
These results support the hypothesis that deviant subjects are relatively more motivated by social image. The argument is simple: in phase 1, the only way an image-motivated donor has to look good is to donate a large portion of his endowment. However, in phase 2, a donor would discover that there are two ways to earn the esteem of others: donate a large portion of his endowment, or donate a somewhat smaller amount to an e cient charity. In other words, image-motivated donors may substitute donations for e ciency, increasing both their take-home earnings and social esteem. When news is good thus, the relative cost of looking pro-social decreases across phases. This is consistent with traditional choice theory: image-motivated donors target a specific donation amount to maximize utility, and when e ciency is better than expected, they maintain the size of the e↵ective gift by decreasing the donation amount.
Conclusion
We set out to investigate the e↵ect information about charities' e ciency and its public visibility have on the intensive margins of charitable giving. To do so, we propose a simple framework and we implement a laboratory experiment. In our model existing donors with di↵erent intrinsic preferences for giving treat their donations as either complements or substitutes to the quality of the recipient. Greater e ciency induces some donors to give more, since an extra dollar donated goes "further". Other donors instead reduce their giving, because the same e↵ective donation can now be achieved with a smaller nominal contribution (i.e. crowd-out). Similarly, when information about "quality" is immediately recognizable by others, its social signaling value provides extrinsic incentives to image motivated donors to modify their giving: on the one hand higher e ciency increases the marginal return on social image of an extra dollar donated, thus giving increases; on the other, higher e ciency reduces the cost of looking pro-social, and donors trade-o↵ the amount they give with the "quality" of the recipient.
Using a laboratory experiment with treatments that progressively increase the visibility of donation amounts and charities' e ciency, we assess the relative importance of two forces.
Our data show no evidence of a substitution e↵ect when information is received privately. On the contrary, we find that between 16 and 18% of donors increase their donations when discovering that their charities are better-than-expected. We also find that individuals tend to disregard bad news about their own charities when giving happens under full anonymity. To the extent to which giving is made in private, our results suggest that the di↵usion of this type of information would increase average contributions from existing donors.
Di↵erently, we find evidence of both a complementarity and substitution e↵ect when information has a social signaling value. In this case, 34% of donors who change their decisions do so by reducing their donations after receiving good news, and increasing donations after receiving bad news. We show that the substitution e↵ect is driven by individuals who are relatively more motivated by social-image, who trade o↵ the size of their gifts with the "quality" of the recipients.
Our experiment sheds light on e↵ect information has on the intensive margins of the market for giving (e.g. existing donors). Future work may take advantage of our complementarity-substitution framework to study the e↵ect of information on the extensive margins of giving (e.g. new donors). Our results suggest that public information changes the relative cost of looking pro-social for image motivated donors. While we find that this e↵ect reduces giving from existing donors, it may instead incentivize non-donors to start giving because looking pro-social becomes "a↵ordable".
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